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Georgios Tsagdis
“For the universities 
are far from having followed 
the progress of the academies”
— Étienne de Condillac1
Summoning a few reflections, at most provisional and topical. They salute an 
auspicious beginning. A journal is born, engendered under the genitive: ‘of 
Intellectual Freedom’. The genitive claims thus a space under interminable siege. 
A journal is born at the barricades of thought and theory, since one can never 
give freedom without protecting and shielding it. An ancient name of the shield 
is problema, what is pro-jected before the vulnerable body. It is a name that 
invites the problems without which freedom cannot be defended, without which 
its name is empty.
 For it is clear: today freedom is threatened most by those who speak in its 
name. Who dares question the lady with the torch of reason and progress? Yet 
who sees in her more than a lifeless statue? A universal assent to freedom has 
long become the constitutive banality of market capitalism. The liminal practice 
of thought has thus abandoned the oppressive farce unfolding around its effigy. 
Silence is offered to her as last tribute.
 In this beginning however the genitive transforms every free utterance 
into an utterance on freedom: a guiding correspondence and a regenerative 
responsibility. It thus insists on asking for and before, again and against, 
with and without freedom. For the first and most telling sign of the ongoing 
repression of thought in the name of freedom, is the eclipse of the question. 
Increasingly, in the guardianship of academic publications, aside of the object, 
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the method and the depository of data-information, ultimately the question 
comes to be predetermined by the demand for secure knowledge.2  Thus, 
the safest way to navigate the Scylla and Charybdis, the two reviewers who 
represent blind, decisive objectivity for every journal, is to scavenge the journal’s 
latest ‘suggestions for further research’.
 Those bodies that undertake the construction and dissemination of 
knowledge certainly suspect the feigned innocence of the question. Yet, if even 
the last bastion of the question must be surrendered, where is thought to find 
shelter? Derrida, speaking of the French university in the late 1970s, exposes in a 
gesture of hope its benevolent naivety: “Since the question is not, it is believed, 
a thesis, it would not pose, impose, or suppose anything. This alleged neutrality; 
the nonthetic appearance of a question that is posed without even seeming 
to pose itself, is what constructs the teaching body.”3  Can we say that much 
today? Do universities, any more than journals, allow students and teachers to 
ask questions? Which spaces admit the question and who is allowed to access 
them? 
 Academy, since the millennial Platonic experiment in Athens, has been the 
name of countless renaissances. From its Florentine recreation by Cosimo de’ 
Medici and the milieu organized by Bessarion around the Vatican Library in the 
Quattrocento, to the modern national academic bodies of science, humanities, 
arts and even the military, academies have designated radically diverse, yet 
always highly exclusive institutions. Today, we might attempt a most inclusive 
definition, by designating as academic the total space in which an apparatus4  
organizes a system of bodies and non-bodies such as universities, journals, 
publishers, conferences, societies, projects and so on. This maximal space 
remains exclusive through multiple (economic, sociological, epistemological, 
micro-political) resistances.
 Where in the coordinates of this academic space lies the rift between 
continuity and event and how does this rift determine the questions that must 
be asked today? This is already a question that comes from the rift, a question 
that confronts the present with the rift, a question that sets questions in motion. 
Thus one keeps on asking: can this maximal academic space, fragmented and 
tense, afford sufficient space to thought?5  Derrida reads Heidegger’s move 
from What is Metaphysics? (1929) to his infamous inaugural speech upon the 
assumption of the Rectorate of Freiburg University, the Self-Affirmation of the 
German University (1933), as a move towards a realization that the responsibility 
of philosophy, proceeding from the call of Being cannot be fulfilled within the 
university.6  Can we even fathom this insufficiency today?
 In the ever-broadening margins of para-academia the call for a radical 
reformation or abandonment of the university, the copyright and the countless 
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barriers to participation and creative practices, has been growing ever-louder. 
Its protestations are muffled however by the din of the ongoing generalized war 
of all against all. In this state of nature, it is not an obsolete absolutism, but an 
evergreen liberalism that decries freedom as a fatal act of imagination, as the 
untimely luxuriation of fat cows, oblivious to the nearing wolves. Freedom of 
thought is thus subjected to the freedom of market, consumption determines 
creation. 
 It is not a completed process. As in the epigraph of the text, a certain lag, 
an anachronism defines the academic space. While however Condillac’s call 
demanded an institutional acceleration to catch up with the pace of thought, 
thought seeks protection today behind the problem of this asynchrony, where 
knowledge is commanded to keep pace with the market. The spirit of the 
university, the spirit which philosophy and the humanities at large have always 
championed, hopes to be rescued by the inertia of its institutional body. This 
spirit is forced however out of the body, a body that has no space for spirit, 
forced thus to wander as homeless spectre. Its exile is more often lamented as 
tragedy, than augured as the fulfillment of freedom. Is it because at the moment 
of its departure the spirit realizes it was all along nothing but body?  
 At the same time, the body which ejects the spirit, weary of its inertia, 
undoes itself. It dismembers its constituents and delocalizes its functions (agile 
structures, condensed intercontinental degrees, online resources, international 
funds, worldwide digital exposure). Thus the institutional body becomes pure 
space, its virtuality becomes its virtue, the efficacy and force of the root vir. It 
wields thus a power at once overbearing and precarious. 
 Here we have thus the first cascading manifold of suspensions: between 
spirit and body, body and space, space and power, power and extinction. What 
we might call the academic, traverses the manifold, extends and reaches across 
the suspensions to define its space. This space thus does not define, nor is it 
defined by the occupation or keeping of positions (chairs, offices, campuses, or 
any form of establishment), but by an interminable oscillation between opaque 
pasts and incalculable futures. Thus space opens onto time, which carries the 
semblance of a tout court openness of the academic space. This openness 
however does not preclude exclusion nor does it entail a promise any more than 
a confrontation with a testament, the reminder of an utmost danger, a difficult 
freedom. 
 Countless suspensions striate the academic space. A few vectors might 
be arranged, in the following, around four interweaving foci: finality, reason, 
knowledge and censorship. In all four the Kantian moment is nodal—and 
one cannot revisit this moment without passing through Derrida’s extensive 
engagement with the ensuing problematic.7
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 Beginning thus with the telos of the academy. What is the end of the 
university, of the production and dissemination of knowledge, what is its limit 
and destination, defining it from its inception to the present and future? Even: 
should such a telos altogether exist? Should it be singular or plural? And if this 
logic of finality is to be preserved, should it be located inside or outside the 
academic space, fall within the sovereign power that defines its territory? 
 Power, already before the institution of the academic space, has entered 
the question. It is the relationship of power and finality that determines the 
founding act from which the academic space unfolds. This founding act, 
primarily liminal and thus exceptionally exceptional, is not subject to the logic 
that it founds, not bound by the laws that proceed from it, being of a different 
order than the order it produces. Accordingly, “the foundation of a university 
institution is not a university event,”8  nor is the foundation of an academic 
journal a publication event. In each case, a horizon opens which must engage 
a power that exceeds it. Thereby this very horizon, the end of each part and 
ultimately of the totality of the academic space, is called to delimit this power. It 
is not merely that the power exercised in the founding act decides the horizon: 
the horizon rather emerges as the containing and suspending limit in the face of 
a power that constantly attracts the interior of the academic space to an outside 
beyond itself. 
 Power has been insufficiently thought from the limit. Rather, two positions 
have dominated the historical possibilities of this space to the present day. 
The first, accepts the higher order that is operative in the founding act as a 
necessary heteronomy. Employability becomes then the service the university 
promises to deliver, the marketing of knowledge becomes the function of 
publications. Research is placed institutionally in the service of oil companies, 
think tanks and the military. This is not without effects upon the scope, practice, 
logic, language and technology of knowledge. The creation of the Internet 
is only the latest of the products of knowledge under military guidance. This 
guidance has wrought nothing less than a total transformation of information. 
And if ‘information or informatization’ is what relates the basic to the 
oriented, the purely rational and metaphysical to the technical,9  the military, 
spearheading the creation of the Internet has effectuated nothing less than a 
total transformation of the relation of knowledge with itself.
 Such heteronomy creates the manifest possibility of the most radical 
benefit and danger. Thus a second response running from Plato and Aristotle, 
to Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger attempted to neutralize the danger, while 
utilizing the potential of the mutual investment of knowledge and power. This 
utilization rested on making knowledge, in thinking and teaching, an end in itself. 
Knowledge should never be a slave to a foreign master, the academic space 
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should have its own law. This law was to be reason. 
 The autonomy of knowledge meant then that reason should be the finality, 
the horizon, of the academic space. The principle of reason became the guardian 
and guarantor of knowledge. Construed by Leibniz as the principle of sufficient 
reason, it meant at once that everything that happened had a reason as well as 
that for every truth, reason could and should be rendered (“omnis veritatis reddi 
ratio potest”).10  This rendering of reason implies an exchange, giving reason 
in return for truth, which sets in motion an economy of knowledge as much 
as a structure of power (potestas). This principle of rendering reason became 
the ground upon which for Heidegger the university and science at large was 
founded and built, that upon which they both still rest (baut, gegrundet, ruht).11  
The principle of reason came to structure thus what Kant called the 
architectonics of knowledge. We read Derrida: “Reason adds no content; it 
organizes a system, coordinates and provides the organic form; it totalizes 
according to an internal principle. Architectonics, the art of the system, is 
nothing other than the theory of the ‘scientificity’ of our knowledge, since this 
scientificity depends on systemic organicity.”12  Reason is thus the power of 
classification, ordering, taxonomy, which defines the structure and domain 
of knowledge.13  Accordingly, the whole structure, its legitimating legitimacy 
rests on the premise that a singular reason guides the totality of knowledge. 
This singular reason, the reason that must always be rendered, provides the 
systematic unity of fundamental knowledge and distinguishes it from empirically 
organized, applied knowledge.14  The latter never enquires upon the unifying 
power that constitutes its ground, but this suspension of enquiry, the silence of 
the question, is for Heidegger not counter-productive, but the very ground of 
academic productivity.15 
 The academic space was founded, structured and organized by reason, 
which continues to determine it in apparent and subterranean ways. The 
principle of reason was seen as the most intimate finality of this space, its 
proximal self-de-finition. Reason was taken thus to suspend power, since what is 
ordered by and of itself has no need or use for power. In that sense the Kantian 
project appears as an attempt to delimit the censoring power of the state, 
through the non-power of pure reason, a reason conceived as heterogenous 
to power.16  This hope however was from the beginning a lost cause—not only 
because the church, the state, and finally the market have always exercised a 
constitutional power within the academic space, but because power and reason 
are the two faces of Janus, the singular god of becoming and of the gates that 
lead beyond the academic space. 
 This is why “there is no neutral or natural place in teaching.”17  Nor is 
there a neutral place in writing, in asking questions, in thinking. There is no 
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neutral place in the university and yet the university must be the natural space 
of neutrality. It must shelter what cannot be sheltered, what is essentially 
exposed to a power that proceeds from itself yet exceeds its own horizon.  
Accordingly, Derrida will join in the critique of Schelling: “Kant is wrong to wish 
there were something like a specialized institutional place, a department for 
philosophy. Since philosophy is everywhere, one must not reserve a place for it. 
Above all, one must not assign it a place.”18  Since the power that traverses and 
exceeds the academic space, a space structured by reason, cannot be made 
into a separate species, since reason must be common within and without the 
academic space, the suspension that pertains to it is not between a powerless 
interior and a powerful exterior, an exterior saturated with forces alien to reason, 
but that of a precarious balance of power, the power of reason over against 
the power of the military, the state, the market and so on. In this balance, the 
opposing sides share more than they are willing to admit: reason pervades every 
structure, every structure structures in immediate and unforeseen ways reason. 
 To disregard this fundamental relation of reason and power, to wish to 
abolish or even suspend the latter, is the primary danger for the academic 
space: “one step further toward a sort of original an-archy risks producing or 
reproducing the hierarchy.”19  Thought must confront the danger of its power 
and assume the principle of reason that dominates it, while moving beyond 
it. Thought itself must become the suspension between arche and an-arche. 
“Between the two, the difference of a breath or an accent, only the enactment 
of this ‘thought’ can decide.”20  This enactment is the step that leads beyond the 
academic gates.
 Indeed, the academic space as we still primarily regard it, a protected 
realm where the diction of the outside has in principle limited power and where 
reason becomes its own omnipotent-powerless law, is a very brief moment 
in the history of thought. Kant stands at the threshold of this transformation: 
“he is a "Dozent," someone who reaches disciples and whose qualifications 
are recognized by the State. He has a status, which is no longer the status 
that dominated in philosophy before Kant. Neither Descartes, nor Spinoza, nor 
Leibniz, nor Hume, nor any of the philosophers of the eighteenth century had 
such a status. Between the formulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason by 
Leibniz and the Kantian Critiques, there is a sort of becoming-institution, more 
exactly, a becoming-state-institution of reason, a becoming-faculty of reason.”21 
 We are witnessing the end of this era. The moment is slipping irrevocably 
from our grasp. What power could suspend its passing? What power, except for 
that of pure, unadulterated reason could desire a sempiternal nunc stans of this 
moment? Kant could hope for no more than the imaginary space he demarcated 
for thought. This space was meant to protect the freedom of reason that would 
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find its end in itself, useless and powerless outside the academic gates. “Pure 
reason should, by rights, exercise no censorship and should be exempt from 
all censorship. Now, this limit between reason that censors and reason foreign 
to censorship does not circumvent the university, but passes right through 
it, right between the two classes of faculties: the higher faculties (theology, 
law, medicine), linked to the State power they represent and the lower faculty 
(philosophy). No power should have a right of inspection [droit de regard] over 
the Faculty of Philosophy, as long as it is satisfied with saying, not doing, with 
saying the truth without giving orders with speaking within the university and 
not outside of it.”22
 Could this suffice today? Everything is at stake. The space which was no 
more than nominally realized, is no longer tolerated by its outside. At the same 
time, the university continues to remove ideas from the public sphere,23  not in 
order to protect itself from the repercussions, and even less in order to protect 
the ideas themselves, but in order to exploit them all the better. The university 
becomes thus a closely monitored laboratory of thought were ideas are tested 
to their depletion in an airtight environment, where a speck of the outside 
implicates catastrophe. 
 Fredric Jameson understands this removal and consignment of ideas to 
a minutely supervised environment as a sectoral specialization in line with the 
maximal division of labour of late capitalism. The academic space accordingly 
constitutes the Aufhebung or sublation of ideas: “assigning them an undoubted 
sectoral validity within itself, and thus at once canceling and preserving them”24  
This preservation-elimination decides academic productivity as much as the 
silence that enshrouds the ground of reason. They are both tropes of Aufhebung 
if the latter is to be thought as a non-progression with regard to itself, that is, 
with regard to the originary interrelation of logos and physis. Perhaps in both 
cases it is more appropriate to speak of suspension. What seems preserved-
eliminated is in truth suspended: the question of the ground as much as 
sectoralized discourses are trapped in the permafrost of the poles of academic 
space, whence they might or might not return to thought, namely to thought’s 
essential exposition to the outside. 
 There are questions that these few reflections have suspended, while 
others have been altogether abandoned. The very question on the meaning 
of suspension has been suspended in order to facilitate the free-play of these 
thoughts. All along, two senses have been operative: suspension as withholding 
within limits—arrest and adjournment—and suspension as hovering across and 
beyond these limits. These reflections will then have reached their provisional 
and salutary destination if they have made apparent that the freedom of the 
academic space hinges on the inter-determination of the two senses.
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